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Abstract. This article highlights a number of themes useful in the gendered analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America by means of a comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile. It starts from the assumption that much of the work on democratisation in Latin America -both orthodox and the literature concentrating on women and transitions -produced up until now, has been too voluntaristic in its approach. It argues that what is needed, particularly in the study of democratic consolidation, is an analysis not only of the impact of women and women's organisations on institutions and structures but also of how these institutions and structures can shape and change gender relations and different women's activities. Any gendered analysis of democratic consolidation must begin by examining the terms of transition which, while they can be subject to some renegotiation later, affect the nature of the subsequent system and the space available to different actors. It is argued that a number of characteristics of the post-transition system are significant : first the impact of more arbitrary populist or presidential systems, second the importance of women's organising both inside and outside the state and party systems and third the existence of an institutionalised party system.
In recent years the study of democratisation in Latin America has shifted from an examination of the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the subsequent transition to competitive electoral politics to a focus on consolidation. Part of a trend within comparative politics more generally, this literature returned the focus of analysis to the nature of institutions and examined their role in the consolidation of democracy." This Georgina Waylen is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Sheffield.
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Council (ESRC) of the UK, grant number R. I would like to thank everyone at the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Stanford, for their hospitality while I was a visiting scholar in -, as well as everyone, too many to mention here, who helped me with the research in Chile and Argentina. I would also like to thank Elisabeth Friedman, Tony Payne and the anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this article. development marked a move away from the more voluntaristic focus of much of the early democratisation literature which gave great emphasis to the choices and decisions of elites without providing sufficient consideration of the impact of (political) institutions and structures on actors' decisions and outcomes.# While this actor-orientated emphasis may have been more justified in the earlier ' phases ' of democratisation, it became less relevant once political institutions began to reassert themselves. Much of the mainstream literature has focused on a number of issues : what is meant by democratic consolidation, which types of transitions and systems are more or less likely to become consolidated and what can be done to encourage consolidation.$ Although scholars have differed in their exact definition, consolidation is generally seen as the institutionalisation of a competitive electoral system that is accompanied by a commitment to and a consensus about the ' rules of the game '. A system in which ' democracy becomes the only game in town ' is seen as likely to endure.% Concern has been expressed by political scientists at a number of characteristics which are seen as reducing the likelihood that democratising systems in Latin America will become consolidated. These include : the weakness and even collapse of political parties, the emergence of ' delegative democracy ', plebiscitarianism and presidentialism and its combination with multipartism.& Many commentators stress the importance of the role played by the political parties as the interlocutors between state and society and the need for effective party systems to channel and represent interests. However, gender issues, while sometimes mentioned, are rarely addressed in any sustained manner.
It is now increasingly recognised that, while institutions have an important place in any analysis of democratic consolidation, these debates tend to have an overly narrow focus, both in terms of the procedural and electoral definitions of democracy used -which exclude broader notions of the quality of democracy -and in terms of the range of actors and institutions analysed. More nuanced analyses would also examine the interaction of institutions with a wider range of actors within civil society, looking for example at ' how social actors adapt to these institutions, and which conditions encourage (newly) mobilised actors to support, sidestep and\or subvert democratic institutions '. ' This article will attempt to do a number of things. First, it will build on the mainstream literature by adding a gendered analysis of institutions missing to date. Second, it will widen the analysis to include a hitherto ignored area : the interaction between institutions and different women and women's movements. It also aims to contribute to the women and transitions literature by adding a much needed institutional dimension.
Indeed not only the mainstream democratisation literature failed to analyse the impact of institutions. Much of the writing on women and transitions in Latin America has displayed similar characteristics. While not focusing on the actions of elites, the women and transitions literature has also often been overly voluntaristic, tending to privilege the actions of women's social movements and women's mobilisations. It would be wrong to underestimate the important contribution made by this work. We now know a great deal about the significant role played by women's movements in many cases of regime breakdown in Latin America and this has provided a useful corrective to the gender blindness of the majority of the mainstream scholarship.( However, until recently, little has been done to examine the interaction between women and political institutions during attempts at democratic consolidation in Latin America.)
Although a small body of work is beginning to emerge on women and some aspects of competitive electoral politics in Latin America, the most useful studies to provide pointers and frameworks for the gendered study ' Deborah Yashar, ' Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and of contemporary competitive electoral politics look almost exclusively at the liberal democracies of the first world, focusing primarily on the United States, Britain and Scandinavia.* Some of this more general ' gender and politics ' literature highlights the need to consider political institutions and structures. It underlines the need to examine the effect of different party structures on the position of women within political parties, and the impact of different systems of candidate selection -whether centralised\ local and formal\informal party systems -on the numbers of women selected. The relationship between different electoral systems and levels of women's representation is also important : for example the influence of proportional representation versus first past the post systems, party and district magnitude, open or closed lists and rates of incumbency on the numbers of women elected. Once in office, it is useful to examine how women vote, behave and legislate."! This literature has also been concerned with the relative efficacy of the different strategies that can be used to improve women's representation and the role played by women organising inside and outside political parties to achieve this. In the area of gender-related policies, attention has focused on welfare and more recently on state women's machineries, such as women's ministries and how they operate -an issue that has been becoming an increasingly important in many Latin American countries."" In contrast to much of the women and democratisation literature, this kind of approach demonstrates the significance of analysing the nature of political structures and institutions and the activities of women involved in them.
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the complex processes at work during recent attempts at democratic consolidation in Latin America, gendered analyses of institutions, such as political parties and the state, are a necessary component. This entails a consideration not only of the impact of women and women's movements on institutions and structures, but also of how these institutions and structures can shape and change gender relations and women's activities in particular settings. Political struggles are inevitably mediated by the institutional context in which they take place. The ways in which institutions can shape not only actors ' strategies and their outcomes, but also their goals need to be investigated."# This article will therefore examine the interaction of the strategies and goals of various actors with differing institutions and their outcomes. Many of the actors under consideration share similar goals, but the strategies adopted to achieve those ends vary in different institutional contexts. The goals can be divided into two related but distinct parts : first to increase the number of women involved in politics, particularly at national levels either as elected representatives in legislatures or within political parties ; second to achieve the implementation of ' womenfriendly ' policies often through institutional measures such as the establishment of state women's machineries. It becomes important to ask whether different types of party structure and systems -such as presidential versus parliamentary or weak versus strong party systemsafford women actors differential opportunities for participation and influence in consolidating electoral systems in Latin America ; and whether these systems exhibit differences in terms of their gender-related policies. This focus will complement the mainstream literature which examines institutional characteristics, such as constitutional design and party institutionalisation, seen as playing an important role in democratic consolidation in Latin America, but which almost entirely ignores both gender relations and the actions of different women and women's movements."$ This undertaking will be pursued by means of a comparative analysis of Argentina from - and Chile from -. These two Southern Cone countries were chosen as case studies because, despite their many similarities, they have had somewhat different experiences of transition and consolidation. Given the variations both in transition politics and women's organising, a comparative approach will allow us to see whether any common themes and questions emerge that can help to provide a framework for the gendered analysis of contemporary competitive electoral politics in other Latin American cases, in addition to drawing some conclusions about the significance of events to date in each country.
The Terms of Transition in Argentina and Chile
It has been increasingly recognised that the particular form taken by the non-democratic regime and the nature of the transition to competitive electoral politics play an important role in structuring the nature of the subsequent regime, including the opportunities available to various political actors."% Haggard and Kaufman refer to this as the ' terms of transition '."& They argue that the particular terms structure not only civil\military relationships, but also political competition and the institutional arrangements of the new system. As the contrasting cases of Chile and Argentina demonstrate, the capacity of the military to shape the outcome of the transition depends in part on the circumstances of their withdrawal, for example whether there is an economic crisis or military defeat as in Argentina or a negotiated withdrawal from a position of strength as in Chile. However, Haggard and Kaufman argue that the terms are not necessarily settled at the time of transition and, while they exert a powerful influence on subsequent events, they can be subject to some renegotiation."' A gendered analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America must begin by examining the terms of transition, both in terms of the impact different groups of women had on those terms and the ways in which the terms helped to structure both gender relations and women's activities subsequently. Mala Htun, for example has argued that the different institutional configurations established by the terms of transition have a crucial impact on subsequent gender policy outcomes."( It has generally been acknowledged that in many cases women's movements played an important part in the initial breakdown of authoritarian rule. However, with the very partial exception of the Chilean case, this role was not often translated into influence over the nature of the reconstituting political An analysis of the role of women's organisations in the case study countries indicates that they had little influence over the Argentine transition, but some influence in the Chilean case. In Argentina the military withdrew in the midst of economic crisis and military defeat and an exit under these circumstances constrained the influence of the armed forces over the terms of transition. The Argentine transition has been characterised as an un-pacted and ' free ' transition in which the political parties could refuse the overtures of the military and in which, as a consequence, few restrictions were placed on the political system. Argentina returned to its  constitution, which has been seen as the de jure and de facto source of subsequent hyperpresidentialism, allowing executive dominance and rule by decree.#! Some attempts were made by the presidential candidates to woo women voters in the elections of  with promises of changes to discriminatory laws such as Patria Potestad and discussion of divorce.#" But despite the relative openness of the transition, the influence of women's groups was limited. A number of feminist organisations such as the Movimiento para Liberacio! n Femenina and the Asociacio! n de Mujeres Argentinas had emerged in the s but they were not in a strong position to influence events because of their small size, strategies and loose organisation. They were accustomed to working in small groups in consciousness raising and self-reflection and to see politics in terms of individuals rather than groups.##
The potentially more influential human rights group, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, had been an important force in bringing about the ' end of fear ' under the dictatorship and delegitimising the military government internationally through their campaign demanding the return of their disappeared children (so much so that Alfonsı! n used their rhetoric and slogan ' We are Life ' in his electoral campaign). Although the diminished power of the military facilitated the trial of some of those accused of human rights abuses, the Madres saw few of their demands met fully both during and after the transition.#$ It has been claimed that, in common with other human rights movements, ' the origins and nature of the movement -which had made it uniquely effective under authoritarian rule -limited its ability to respond to the new democratic environment '.#% A number of factors contributed to this. The symbolic, ethical and non-negotiable nature of the Madres ' demands was effective in a political environment in which bargaining was impossible. But in the context of transition and consolidation, bargaining became more effective. In addition ' the determined, charismatic and single-minded leadership ' which was needed under military rule was often inappropriate for the new political conditions. However, Brysk argues that while the human rights movement achieved less than it had intended, unprecedented and significant reforms were implemented that ' would have been weaker, or later, or perhaps would not have happened at all without the Argentine human rights movement '.#&
In contrast Chile provides perhaps a classic example of a longer, noncrisis led, negotiated transition in which the military regime was able to play a key role in constructing a new system which was designed to ensure that its vision of the world would be maintained. The military exercised ## Marı! a del Carmen Feijoo! and Marcela Nari, ' Women and Democracy in Argentina ', in Jaquette (ed.), The Women's Movement in Latin America,p .. #$ The human rights movement wanted a bi-cameral commission to investigate human rights abuses, the punishment of all those responsible for the repression, the immediate release of all political prisoners and the retirement of all members of the police and judiciary in place during military rule. None of these demands was implemented in full. a significant degree of control over the transition through the constitution of , creating an electoral system which would ensure the overrepresentation of the right and a two party system to replace the historic three-way division.#' In addition the president and executive were given extensive potential powers, including control over legislation. However, between Pinochet's defeat in the  plebiscite and the  elections, some of the terms were re-negotiated. The number of elected senators was increased and the opposition centre-left coalition, the Concertacio! n, moderated its position on human rights, dropping its call for the abrogation of the  amnesty law and shifting its human rights policy from an equal emphasis on the need for truth and justice to one which prioritised truth.#( The military regime also wanted to ensure that the conservative gender relations it had attempted to enforce would endure. One of the regime's last acts was to outlaw therapeutic abortions that had been legal since . At the same time the regime stipulated that the wife of the head of the armed forces, rather than the spouse of the new president, should remain the head of the state-controlled women's organisation, CEMA-Chile (Centros de Madres-Chile) which it had used to try to co-opt poor women.#) However, in what has been seen as its highpoint so far, the Chilean feminist movement was more organised by the mid-to late s than had been the case during the earlier transition in Argentina.#* Feministas (feminists) and polıT ticas (women political activists) made more concerted attempts to influence the terms of the transition.$! Following the strategic decision of many feminists to enter the unfolding political process in the mid s, for example by participating in the Asamblea de la Civilidad in , they worked within the political parties of the centre and left, campaigning for an increase in influence for women within the party structures.$" Women in the Partido Socialista (PS) organised a women's section, the Federacio! n de Mujeres Socialistas (FMS). As a consequence, in the aftermath of the  plebiscite the umbrella left grouping Partido por la Democracia (PPD) and PS introduced quotas for women for internal party bodies (but not candidate selection) of  per cent in the PPD and  per cent in the PS. These efforts culminated in the formation of the Concertacio! nd e Mujeres por la Democracia, a group of women active in the parties of the centre-left coalition, the Concertacio! n, together with independent feminists. Disillusioned with the continued lack of influence of women on the unfolding political process and the selection of very few women candidates for the forthcoming elections, the women's Concertacio! n elaborated a programme to be incorporated into the Concertacio! n's election manifesto. This included a proposal for the institutionalisation of ' women's interests ' in the state through a women's ministry.$# In contrast, groups outside the political process such as the predominantly female human rights agrupaciones (groups) such as the AFDD (Agrupacio! n de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos), had far less influence over the transition. While they maintained critical support for the centre-left opposition, they disagreed with the abrogation of the amnesty law and were unhappy with the ' political contingency ' that emphasised reconciliation and prioritised truth over justice, making the trial of all those accused of human rights abuses impossible.$$ In both cases, the terms of transition culminated in the reconstitution of rather conventional institutional arrangements with the re-emergence of traditional parties and ' business as usual ' in gender terms. But the picture is complex. The relatively speedy unpacted transition in Argentina saw a return to the previous form of presidential system, while in the longer negotiated Chilean transition the military attempted to refashion the political system. In Argentina no women's organisations influenced the terms of transition despite the relative lack of institutional constraints. However, in Chile despite the greater constraining influence of the military, the very different conditions in combination with larger and $" Natacha Molina and Claudia Serrano, ' Las mujeres frente a la polı! tica ', Proposiciones, vol.  (), pp. - ; and Marı! a Elena Valenzuela, ' Mujeres y polı! tica : logros y tensiones en el proceso de redemocratizacio! n', Proposiciones, vol.  (), pp. better organised women's organisations actively engaging with many of the political parties, meant that some groups did have more impact on the terms of transition. In both countries the influence of the human rights groups over the terms of transition was more indirect than direct. The following section examines the impact that differing terms of transition and institutional contexts had on the constraints and opportunities available to the different actors and their responses.
Competitive Electoral Politics in Argentina
Although Argentina has been identified as having a tendency towards hyperpresidentialism (particularly prior to the constitutional reform of ), its party system is fairly well institutionalised and parties remain significant political actors.$% For many women activists attempting to increase levels of gender equity in politics, parties therefore remain an important focus for pressure, despite the central role that can be played by the president in either promoting or preventing change.
Since the s Argentina's political history has been dominated by the military and Peronism, a populist movement with its own political party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), whose corporatist and statist tendencies are hard to characterise on a left\right continuum. The Union Cı! vica Radical (UCR), a more liberal middle class political party, also played a role. Carlos Menem, a Peronist, won the  presidential election after the economic failure of Alfonsı! n's UCR government, elected in  because (unlike the Peronists) it was untainted by the repression and failures of the outgoing military regime. Although he pursued a very un-Peronist programme of neo-liberal economic reform, Menem proved to be a populist leader who halted the trend towards the greater insitutionalisation of the PJ and presided over increasing presidentialism within the Argentine system. Amid growing allegations of corruption, Menem frequently governed by decree and even struck a deal with Alfonsı! n that allowed him to remain in office for another term in return for a reduction in presidential powers.$& On the return to civilian rule, very few women were elected to congress. In the  elections, only . per cent of the new deputies were women and this proportion was maintained in the elections of  and . However, beginning a trend followed in other parts of the region, Given that the legal institution of a quota system affecting all political parties -rather than one introduced by an individual party -was then so unusual, it is important to ask why it was passed in Argentina. Three main reasons can be identified. Part of the explanation lies in the history of Peronism. During the first Peronist government in which Eva Pero! n (Evita) played a significant role, unofficial quotas for women existed within the PJ and the number of women in congress reached nearly  per cent in the early s. Thus the notion of quotas for women was not without precedent in Argentine political history. Second, although put forward by a Radical, the  quota law was supported by an alliance of different women. Women activists from within the political parties, particularly the PJ and UCR, were joined by groups of women, including feminist NGOs, organising outside the parties.$' The government women's body, the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer (established in ) also participated actively in the campaign, which involved mobilisation to lobby congress and the careful targeting of particular deputies. Feminists involved in the campaign have argued that a deliberate part of the strategy was to stress that quotas would help to make Argentina a modern and fully democratic society and as such they were attempting to use the opportunities afforded by the political context of consolidation.$( Third, the support of President Menem was also crucial as, at that time, he was sympathetic to ' women's issues ' and was known to favour the quota law.
While it is still too early for a comprehensive analysis, it is possible to draw some interim conclusions about the impact of the Ley de Cupos on Argentine politics. At first, although the numbers of women elected $' M. J. Lubertino, Informe sobre la ley de cuotas (Buenos Aires, ). $( Interview with Gloria Bonder, Director of CEM and ex-member of Menem's women's cabinet,  May .
increased so that in  women comprised . per cent of the total number of deputies, the parties did not comply fully with the new law, despite the continued mobilisation by women both in and outside the parties to support it.$) Initially only an individual woman who felt wrongly treated could challenge the list, thereby risking the wrath of her party. At the same time, judges adjudicating the cases were sometimes antagonistic.$* After changes instituted in the  constitution, which allowed the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer and others to challenge party lists and the continued mobilisation in support of the law, the compliance rate increased with the majority of parties placing women in electable positions.%! As a result . per cent of the deputies elected in the  elections were women, a figure which was maintained in the  elections. There is also evidence that the presence of the quota law has a ' contagion ' effect. It brings increased pressure to bear on other institutions and organisations, such as trade unions to introduce similar measures. For example, by  quota laws had been enacted for provincial elections in  of Argentina's  provinces.%" The constitutional assembly of  provides one clear example of the impact of the Ley de Cupos. Elections were held according to the quota law and as a result . per cent of the assembly members were women who organised across party lines on some issues. After pressure from women members, in addition to the clauses that strengthened the Ley de Cupos, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was enshrined in the constitution. Marı! a del Carmen Feijoo! , a feminist member of the constituent assembly, has argued that as a result of intense cross party activity, a clause outlawing abortion under any circumstance was prevented from being inserted, despite pressure from Menem.%# These examples show that the actions of the women members of the constituent assembly were rendered more effective by the cross party alliances that they made.
$) The percentage of women elected as deputies was . % but because only half the seats were contested the percentage of women in congress only rose to . %. $* For a discussion of the implementation of the quota law see At the same time a number of other factors act to reduce the impact of the quota law. Compliance still varies between regions and parties. The Ley de Cupos is often disregarded in the provinces that historically have elected fewer women than the capital and the UCR tends to place women in worse positions on its lists than the PJ. The impact of the Ley de Cupos is further restricted because it is not applied to internal party offices. There are still very few women in positions of power within party hierarchies. Despite forming . per cent of party affiliates, in  women formed an average of only . per cent of national party directorates.%$ Finally, some people, particularly non-aligned feminists, are sceptical about the kinds of women who have been elected as a result of the quota system.%% It has been suggested that some are party hacks thought to be manipulable by party hierarchies now searching for malleable women candidates, while others are the partners\relatives of male politicians.
Although the numbers of women elected to congress have increased, there have been very few women in the executive since . The first woman minister ever to have held office in Argentina was not appointed until .I n, perhaps as an alternative to having women in mainstream government positions, Menem instituted a parallel ' women's cabinet ' with no power. The (unpaid) role of ' Menem's women ' was to shadow the real cabinet, advising different ministers on how their policies would affect women, yet with no formal powers of oversight. However, this never really functioned, especially after Menem's actions described below alienated some of the feminists who had previously been sympathetic to him. And it was not until  that Menem appointed his first woman cabinet minister, and then to the rather gender-typical position of the education portfolio.
The Alfonsı! n and Menem governments both established different sets of women's machinery. After creating a number of programmes based in other ministries, the UCR government established the Subsecretarı! adela Mujer in , which had become more active under a feminist leadership by .%& With the election of Menem, in  this was replaced by a new organisation, the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer, charged with ensuring the implementation of CEDAW and ensuring the ' maximum participation of women in all spheres '.%' This body was established by %$ See Informe Nacional : situacioT n de la mujer en la uT ltima deT cada en la RepuT blica Argentina (Buenos Aires, ). %% This opinion was expressed by Sylvia Chejter, feminist and member of Centro de Encuentros Cultura y Mujer (CEYCM), Interview, Buenos Aires  May . %& Zita Montes de Oca claimed that under her leadership the Subsecretarı! a took more overtly feminist positions. Interview (Buenos Aires,  June ). %' Informe Nacional ; SituacioT n de la Mujer en la uT ltima deT cada en la RepuT blica Argentina,p.. decree as part of the presidential office and as part of the government of the day and not as a permanent part of the state apparatus. Initially when Menem was still sympathetic, the Consejo had quite a large budget that reached its peak in . It also played an important role in the run-up to the Beijing women's conference. The Consejo produced an equal opportunities plan for - and established a number of programmes for example to increase women's political participation. However, Virginia Franganillo, its feminist-sympathising head, was forced out after campaigning against the government attempt to insert the anti-abortion clause into the new constitution. This issue was a source of conflict in Cairo (the population conference) as well as in Beijing, where the Argentine official position was the most conservative in Latin America.%( Franganillo's removal prompted the resignation of some feminist members of the women's cabinet and signalled the end of the cordial relations that the Consejo had enjoyed with some feminist groups outside the state. After a long delay she was replaced by a staunch Peronist who was fiercely opposed to reproductive rights.%) As a consequence few feminist NGOs maintained links with the Consejo, and despite the implementation of a $m government Inter-American Development Bank-funded plan to establish Consejos Provinciales de la Mujer to implement programmes in every province, there was a feeling that it had been marginalised from any policymaking role.%* The major political parties have been an important focus of activity for many women attempting to increase the influence of women in politics. A women's section of PJ was formed in the early s and, following pressure from women in the Federal Capital, the party's regulations and charters were amended in  to introduce some positive action measures.&! Some women within parts of the UCR have also made increased efforts to improve the position of women in the party.&" While activity initially focused on the capital, the first national meeting of %( No representatives from the Consejo were included in the official Argentine delegation to Beijing, which was against abortion under any circumstances. %) In an interview, Ester Schiavone, Presidenta of the Consejo, was very keen to identify herself as a menemista, (Buenos Aires,  June ). %* Many feminists I interviewed in  argued that two very different Consejos had existed -one before and one after Franganillo's resignation. They were enthusiastic about the first and had no contact with the second. &! Gloria Bonder and Marcela Nari, ' The  % Quota Law : A Turning Point for Women's Political Participation in Argentina ' in Alice Brill (ed.), A Rising Voice : Women in Politics Worldwide (New York, ), pp. -. &" Marı! a Luisa Storani, a UCR activist and researcher for the Fundacio! n Karacachoff, claimed that in her section of the UCR women activists were making concerted efforts to effect change in the party, Interview (Buenos Aires,  May ). Jutta Marx has undertaken a large-scale study of women's role in the UCR in the Capital Federal in the s. See J. Marx, Mujeres y partidos polıT ticos (Buenos Aires, ).
Radical women was held in .&# Since the early s, one strategy of women party members has been to press for the implementation of the Ley de Cupos internally. However, as a consequence of what McGuire terms the ' movementist ' tendencies of both Peronism and Radicalism, despite strong identities both parties tend to have weakly institutionalised structures.&$ In the PJ there is a wide gulf between formal party rules and the actual power structure and this is reflected in the ways that both leaders and candidates are actually selected.&% The existence of different factions within the parties and regionalism have meant that women have been able to exert much more influence in Buenos Aires than outside of it. Even a new grouping such as the centre-left FREPASO (Frente del Paı! s Solidario) has few highly institutionalised structures. FREPASO was only established in  and is trying to present a new and fresh image free of corruption. Although it has one very prominent women leader (Graciela Ferna! ndez Meijı! de) together with a number of feminists active at the grassroots, it has few other women in powerful positions.
While there have been more feminists active in political parties since the s, the historic tensions between feministas and polıT ticas have not been eliminated. Although some cross-party organising and interaction between politically aligned feminists and female party activists takes place, the high level of party affiliation among women political activists is seen by many ' autonomous feminists ' as a negative factor. Autonomous feminists believe that a commitment to feminism is inevitably diluted by partisan political loyalties, as illustrated by the disputes between feministas and polıT ticas at the huge annual Women's Encuentros.&& At the same time, female party activists express frustration with feminists who, they claim, do not appreciate the difficult situation they are in as regards occasional conflicts of loyalty.&'
As indicated by the preceding discussion, a number of feminist NGOs have been organising outside the state to influence the political system and increase women's representation, for example the Fundacio! n Mujeres en Igualdad has set up training sessions for women politicians and produces In sum, a number of changes have occurred in Argentina since the return to competitive electoral politics. The relatively open institutional context bequeathed by the terms of transition facilitated some legal changes such the introduction of shared Patria Potestad. The Ley de Cupos, the most significant institutional change in gender terms, has changed the electoral system and amended the terms of transition and resulted in an increase in the number of women in congress, despite scepticism about the calibre of some of the women elected. The actions of women organising outside the state to influence the political system have played a key part in achieving and maintaining the pressure for institutional change. The potential impact of the quota law is demonstrated by the influence exercised by a substantial number of women organising together in the constitutional assembly. Despite the relatively high party discipline in congress, the cross-party organising seen in the constituent assembly has also been replicated by some women deputies. In  a reproductive rights proposal was put forward by a woman from the Radical party and was supported by some Peronist deputies together with feminist NGOs outside congress.&* But although they can facilitate cross-party alliances, factionalised parties with relatively weakly institutionalised structures are difficult to pressure for changes in their internal organisation. Despite &( Zita Montes de Oca, the director of the Fundacio! n Mujeres en Igualdad and coordinator of the NGO network argued for an alliance of women's NGOs to be able engage with the state with one NGO being able to speak for several. Interview (Buenos Aires,  June ). &) The Madres objected to the exhumations of unidentified bodies, arguing that they already knew who was dead ; what they needed to know was who killed them. The Abuelas co-operated as they wanted to discover the identities of the female victims and whether they had given birth in order to trace any surviving children and secure their return. organising by female party activists, the increase in the number of women deputies has not been accompanied by a similar increase in the number of women at the top of party hierarchies. Nor has there been a marked increase in the numbers of women in government or the implementation of policies favourable to women. Under an extremely presidential system congress lacks power. As demonstrated by the fate of the Consejo, presidentialism has meant that some gains are dependent on presidential whim and there are fewer opportunities to press for meaningful institutional change and the implementation of ' women friendly ' policies.
Competitive Electoral Politics in Chile
In Chile a strong institutionalised party system has been resurrected which operates within an electoral system designed by the military regime. The Concertacio! n, the centre-left coalition dominated by the Christian Democrats, has won a majority in all congressional and presidential elections held since . But despite repeated attempts, it has been unable to fundamentally alter the terms of transition. The efforts to abolish the nine appointed senators have not yet succeeded as it does not command the necessary two-thirds majority in Congress and so far it has been unable to reach agreement with the right.'! Indeed Pinochet, on retiring as Commander of the Armed forces has become a senator for life.'" The political parties, particularly of the centre-left, and the government women's body SERNAM (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), established in , have remained the focus for women political activists who wish to build on the limited, but nonetheless real, gains achieved during the transition period. Despite the establishment of the Concertacio! n de Mujeres in the run-up to the elections, few women members gained seats in the  elections, forming only . per cent of the total. However, three of the seven women elected had been prominent members of the Concertacio! n de Mujeres and since then there has been a strong feminist contingent among the women deputies. Although fewer women were mobilised for the ' MaT s Mujeres al '! However, under the terms of the constitution, the Concertacio! n is now appointing its own senators and Aylwin could also become a senator for life. '" At the time of writing, Pinochet's future was uncertain. He was forced to spend  days in the UK waiting to see whether an extradition request for human rights abuses lodged by a Spanish judge would be granted. Since his return to Chile in March , having been released buy the British Home Secretary on humanitarian grounds on account of ill health, the Santiago appellate court has been considering a request for Pinochet's immunity as senator-for-life removed, so that he can face trial for human rights abuses which occurred in his regime after  and which are thus not covered by the amnesty the military government granted itself.
Parlamento ' campaign during the  congressional elections, some attempts were made by the Concertacio! n as a whole to place women in safe seats, with party leaders putting pressure on districts to adopt women. However, candidates were selected through primaries and campaigns required huge financial resources, both factors that reduce the likelihood of women being elected.'# In spite of these limited efforts only  of the resulting  Concertacio! n candidates in  were women. Nonetheless, those parties with positive discrimination for internal positions did field more women candidates : the PS had the most with four, the PPD had three while the Christian Democrats (PDC), by far the largest group overall, had only two. No women senators and nine women deputies were elected in  (six from the Concertacio! n and three from the right), forming eight per cent of the total, and others who had been expected to win seats were narrowly defeated.'$ In the  congressional elections, only  of the  candidates for the lower house and  of the  candidates for the senate were women. Of the major parties, only the PDC fielded a woman candidate for the senate and as a consequence only two women were elected to it, one from the PDC and the other a right-wing independent.'% The Concertacio! n fielded  women candidates for the lower house and, continuing the pattern set in , only four were from the PDC (five per cent of their total) ; five each were from the PS and PPD ( and  per cent of their respective totals). On the right, seven (. per cent) of the candidates of the renovated right party Renovacio! n Nacional (RN) were women while five ( per cent) of the pinochetista Unio! n Demo! crata Independiente (UDI) candidates were women. The results of these elections continued the gradual increase in the number of women deputies, with the  women elected comprising ten percent of the total of which seven come from the Concertacio! n and four from RN (with none from the UDI).'& Women now make up  per cent of the PPD deputies,  per cent of the PS deputies,  per cent of the RN deputies and only five per cent of the PDC '# In a primary system, potential candidates for a seat compete amongst themselves to gain the support of local party members to win the candidacy. Positive action measures are therefore difficult to enforce in this kind of system. In  feminists complained that potential women candidates were forced to compete against each other in primaries in the same electoral districts. '$ Patricio Navia and Jose! Marı! a Sandoval, ' Women Candidates and the  elections in Chile ', paper prepared for the Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, . '% Of the other eight women candidates, four came from the Partido Humanista, three from the Communist party and one stood as an independent candidate for the ' Chile  ' alliance. '& Of the other two, one is an independent and the other a member of the Unio! nd e Centro Centro Progresista.
deputies. Despite the relatively strong party discipline within the Chilean party system which mitigates against cross-party alliances, women legislators of the Concertacio! n do have some limited contact with some sympathetic women politicians in RN on issues relating to the welfare of women, children, and families. The impetus for the  Abandonment and Family Support Bill, which stipulated the level of support for a deserted partner and children, came from women representatives from both the Concertacio! n and RN. However, the potential for cross-party alliances is limited because of the politicisation of gender issues such as divorce and reproductive rights, so areas that threaten the gender status quo are excluded.'' Within the political parties, although it is estimated that women make up  per cent of grassroots activists in the Concertacio! n, and - per cent of the activists on the right, there are fewer women in most party central executives and governing bodies, though there are significant differences between the parties.'( The parties vary in their willingness to promote women, either internally or as candidates, whether through informal measures or formal ones such as quotas. Although they all acknowledge the need for more women to be involved in politics, their strategies to achieve this vary. The parties of the right are opposed to any form of affirmative action while, until recently, the centre parties of the Concertacio! n coalition only implemented some limited positive action for candidate selection and the PS and PPD -the renovated left parties within the Concertacio! n -used positive discrimination in the form of quotas but only for party posts.') It is important to ask how far the differences in women's participation exhibited by the different parties of the Concertacio! n can be related to the incidence of positive discrimination and formal quotas.
Feminists have continued to be active within the parties of the centre\left using a number of strategies and tactics to increase women's influence. Many feminists have changed their views as to the most effective way to organise in political parties since the return to competitive electoral politics. At the instigation of women activists, a vice-president for women was created in the PS in  to ensure that gender concerns would be mainstreamed in the party. This occurred after the growing recognition that, despite raising awareness of gender issues, the FMS (the party women's section) had very little power and capacity to pressurise '' Fanny Pollarolo, the feminist PS deputy for District Three (Calama) and PS VicePresident for Women, stressed this in an interview with the author (Santiago,  Jan. ) '( This information comes from Riet Delsing who undertook research on positive action measures for women within the Chilean political parties for SERNAM in  (interview, Santiago  Jan. ). ') Ibid.
party institutions and had become ghettoised, doing little to advance the position of women within the PS.'* Quotas have also remained a key concern for female party activists on the centre\left. In the mid s, many feminists in the PS and PPD expressed doubts about a quota system, arguing that, although the numbers set by the quotas were attained at many levels, they were not large enough to form a ' critical mass ' of women which would enable significant change to occur within the parties. If anything, they argued, the quotas might act as a ceiling to prevent the number of women from increasing further.(! However, although initially ignored, compliance rates have increased significantly and quotas have been extended. The PS increased its quota for internal party positions to  per cent and more recently the PDC, following pressure from PDC women, adopted quotas of  per cent for some internal party positions. These quotas have resulted in an increase in the numbers of women in internal party positions. In  there were no women in the political commissions of the right-wing parties, but in the Concertacio! n parties, women formed  per cent of the PS political commission (up from  per cent in );  per cent of the PPD political commission (up from  per cent in ) but only  per cent of the PDC Consejo Nacional (up from  per cent in ). An attempt has also been made to alter the electoral system through the introduction of national quotas. In  a bill ' to promote the right of women to participate in national public life ' was introduced into congress by prominent Concertacio! n women deputies such as Fanny Pollarolo and Mariana Aylwin. Although this died in committee, it proposed that neither sex should form more than  per cent of internal party positions or candidates for municipal or national elections.(" The executive control over legislation, combined with the lack of women on important congressional committees means that it is very difficult for women deputies to get laws passed without strong backing from the government even with cross-party support.(# At the governmental level, there have been few women in the executive since . Aylwin's cabinet contained only one woman, Soledad Alvear, the head of the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM). Two women '* Fanny Pollarolo was hopeful that the creation of this position would enable women activists to have more influence on the mainstream of the party (interview, Santiago,  Jan. ). (! Marı! a Antonieta Saa, the PPD diputada, ex-mayor of Conchali and women's representative in the Asamblea in , stressed this in an interview (Santiago,  Jan. ). were initially appointed to cabinet by the Frei administration : the ex-head of SERNAM who then became the justice minister together with SERNAM's new head, Josefina Bilbao, but subsequently this number increased to three. The establishment of SERNAM is the principal means by which the Concertacio! n has tried to implement its programme on women. It was created in  and modelled on similar bodies in Brazil and Spain in a form very much influenced by the proposals of the Concertacio! nd e Mujeres described earlier. Its mission is to ' collaborate with the executive in the design and coordination of public policies which put an end to the levels of discrimination which affect women in the family, social, economic, political and cultural arenas '.($ After pressure from women activists, it was established in law rather than by presidential decree and its head was appointed at cabinet level. But after opposition from the right and the Catholic Church, who claimed that the law would subvert the family, its budget and functions -including the ability to execute programmes -were scaled down and it was placed under the auspices of MIDEPLAN, the planning ministry.(% SERNAM has undertaken a variety of activities. It has focused on three main areas : campaigns to increase gender awareness, pilot and targeted group projects, and legal reforms. It has, for example, established a network of regional offices and CIDEMs (Information Centres on Women's Rights) ; published an equal opportunities plan with a clear feminist orientation to be addressed in public policies for the period - ; and run awareness raising campaigns around such issues as domestic violence and illegitimacy. As part of the executive, it has presented bills to Congress which have subsequently become law, as well as providing crucial support through lobbying for bills introduced by deputies such as the intrafamily violence law.(& It has also worked in conjunction with other new state bodies, such as the anti-poverty programme FOSIS (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversio! n Social), and PRODEMU (Programa de Desarrollo de la Mujer), the government created successor to CEMA-Chile which works with poor women. However, the area of intersectoral coordination with other parts of the state has been problematic as SERNAM lacks oversight powers and many of its contacts with other ministries operate on an informal rather than an institutional basis. The controversy that surrounded SERNAM at its inception has continued. In  the unresolved tensions over SERNAM were demonstrated in the disputes before the Beijing Women's conference. The most vocal opposition came from the right and the UDI in particular. But SERNAM does not just face opposition from the right, all the PDC senators except one joined with the right in criticising the Chilean document for Beijing, which was based on SERNAM's equal opportunities plan. These divisions within the Concertacio! n are also replicated within SERNAM, for example between Socialists and Christian Democrats over divorce, and SERNAM has steered clear of contested issues such as reproductive rights.(( As a result it has found it easier to pursue those activities associated with employment training and poverty alleviation, such as the Programme for Women Heads of Household which focuses on poverty reduction by helping women with income generation, rather than on fundamentally challenging existing gender relations.
SERNAM also has a complex relationship with women's movements outside the state. Although it needs strong movements to provide it with legitimacy, it has been seen as weakening those movements as it has become the major interlocutor through which resources are channelled and through which feminists are absorbed into the state. Many of its personnel are ex-activists drawn from NGOs or academics rather than civil servants. It has therefore had a close relationship with some of the feminist NGOs, for example commissioning them to undertake research for SERNAM and collaborating over the preparations for the Beijing Women's Conference. But its relations with the popular women's movements are perhaps most fraught. It now receives much of funding that had come directly to those organisations and NGOs under the military regime. It has little contact with popular organisations that are often deemed to be insufficiently ' professional ' to receive resources. Thus SERNAM has a potentially clientelist relationship with some women's NGOs while at the same time it has ' beheaded ' the feminist movement through its absorption of feminists into its ranks.(* A strong institutional party system has been resurrected in Chile in which there are still relatively few opportunities for women. This has been combined with the creation of a relatively unfavourable electoral system, the product of institutional constraints imposed by the restrictive terms of transition. As a result, despite the lip-service paid by political parties to increase the number of women, there are still few women in congress or in government. However, the case of Chile demonstrates that in more formalised structures it is clearer where pressure can be exerted most effectively. Feminist party activists have had some success in achieving quotas for internal party offices in the parties of the renovated left and the implementation of more fundamental changes to the electoral system has become the goal of some feminists wishing to increase the influence of women in conventional politics. As in Argentina, whatever gains which been made have resulted in large part from the campaigns of women active both inside and outside the political parties. The establishment of SERNAM, an institution which makes some attempts to ensure the implementation of ' women friendly ' policies, is the most significant consequence of the attempts of women activists to influence the transition, despite the institutional constraints. It has advantages over the Consejo in Argentina because it was created by law after effective pressure from women within Concertacio! n and feminists outside the ruling alliance. As such the fate of SERNAM is not as dependent on the presidency. However, the security of its position as part of the state has not yet been put to the test by the election of a radically different government.)!
Conclusions
A gendered analysis of contemporary competitive electoral politics in Chile and Argentina has highlighted a number of general themes that are useful for the examination of other cases. It is necessary to focus both on the strategies and goals of the actors, such as female party activists and women organising outside the state and political parties ; and on the structures and institutions within which these actors operate. In both countries the nature of the pre-existing regime, the timing of the transition, the role (if any) of women's movements and the resulting terms of transition to competitive electoral politics had an important impact on the subsequent nature of gender politics with regard to levels of women's representation and participation within the electoral system and party structures.
Where women activists and women's organisations effectively pressurised some of the (victorious) political parties during the transition, they had some success in getting their demands met after the restoration of electoral politics. In Chile the Concertacio! n de Mujeres por la Democracia lobbied the centre-left Concertacio! n coalition to include a number of items, such as the promise to establish a state women's organisation, in their electoral programme. Such pressure did not occur in the Argentine case. Despite this, although the terms of transition established slightly different types of political system in both cases, both were conventional in gender terms. However, as shown in the Argentine case, these terms of transition were not fixed but were subsequently open to some renegotiation. The quota law and the new constitution, drawn up by a constitutional assembly made up of  per cent women -itself a direct consequence of the Ley de Cupos -which incorporated CEDAW and resisted an anti-reproductive rights clause, demonstrates that modifications to the institutional framework are possible, particularly in a context where the constraints created by the terms of transition are not too restrictive.
Once competitive electoral politics have been restored, a number of characteristics of the post transition political system are significant. First, the Argentine case demonstrates the impact of a more arbitrary populist or presidentialist system. Changes can be achieved. But -as the example of the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer demonstrates -without institutionalisation they are often fragile and can be reversed without any recourse to rules and procedures. Menem began his period in office by appearing to be pro-women's rights and established the Consejo by presidential decree. However, by the  Beijing conference he was taking a more pro-Vatican line and subsequently dismissed the head of the Consejo, reduced its budget and downgraded its activities. In contrast the position of SERNAM in Chile appears more secure in part because it was established after pressure from women activists and by law rather than presidential decree.
Second, both cases demonstrate the importance of women organising both inside and outside the state and party systems to pressure for changes both in the terms of transition and from subsequent civilian governments. It is unlikely that institutionalised changes such as the Ley de Cupos in Argentina would have occurred without this sort of activity. Women activists within both the Peronist and Radical parties had the support of mass mobilisations outside congress and the lobbying activities of a large number of feminist NGOs. In both countries, a number of women's groups, primarily middle class and feminist NGOs that often have contacts already with the state and the political class, have come together to form broad umbrella groupings to lobby the political systems more effectively. Indeed it has been argued that we are now witnessing an ' NGOisation ' of the feminist movement and even a blurring of some of the distinctions between NGOs and the state as NGOs increasingly take on tasks which used to be undertaken by the state and personnel move between the two sites.)" But in both countries popular organisations have had little involvement, and with the exception of the Abuelas and the Lı! nea Fundadora, the predominantly female human rights groups made up of victims ' relatives have also had fewer dealings with the state and mainstream political parties.
Third, the Chilean case demonstrates that although some party systems may resist change, women activists both inside and outside the parties can exert pressure more effectively on an institutionalised party system than on a weak party system. In an institutionalised party system it is clearer where the pressure points are and any changes to the rules can be enforced more easily. However, the evidence is not unequivocal. In Chile feministas and polıT ticas within the centre-left parties, the PPD and the PS, won quotas for internal party positions, but soon discovered that if they were not large enough to form a ' critical mass ', the quotas intended as floors too easily became unofficial ceilings unless constant supervision was exercised. In contrast, the Argentine case demonstrates that the relatively laxer discipline of less institutionalised party structures allows for more crossparty organising by women, demonstrated in the campaign for the quota laws and subsequently over reproductive rights. Political parties therefore remain one important focus for women activists attempting to increase women's influence in conventional political activity. But it is clear that the long-established feminista\polıT tica division has not been superseded.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the institutionalisation of a political system is any guarantee of gender parity. Echoing Mainwaring and Scully's argument, it is not that hyper-institutionalisation is good, but rather that low levels of institutionalisation produce problems and make lasting change difficult to achieve.)# The absence of institutionalisation allows for the dominance of elites, patrimonialism and clientelism that may favour individual women, but does not generally facilitate a long-term increase in the total number of women active in conventional politics. In an institutionalised system there is stability in the rules of competition and party organisations matter ; therefore rules, for example over quotas and candidate selection, can be enforced more easily. The focus of analysis then becomes the nature of the institutional measures proposed by women activists and the ways in which variations in political systems, for example in terms of party structures and electoral systems, affect both the goals and strategies of those activists. In both case study countries electoral quotas have been the main measure advocated to increase the number of women in both legislatures and political parties. The different institutional contexts in Argentina and Chile meant that the campaigns for quotas systems took different forms with different results.
The type of political system established after the return to competitive electoral politics had an impact on the number of women elected in both countries. The binomial system established in Chile is not one in which women find it easy to do well. In addition, the terms of transition mean it is very hard to alter the electoral system, thus the adoption of a national quota system for candidate selection (which might also necessitate the adoption of PR) would be hard to achieve. In Argentina the closed list PR system, combined with factors such as the historical precedence for quotas and the support of the president, facilitated the introduction of a national quota law in a context where the un-pacted transition made the modification of the terms of transition easier to achieve. As a result the campaign for national quotas for candidate selection has been more vigorous and more successful in Argentina.
The differences in party structures in Argentina and Chile have had an impact on the campaigns to introduce quotas within the political parties. In Argentina the weaker institutionalised structures of the main parties have made it hard to institute effective quotas for internal party positions, despite the ' contagion ' effect of the Ley de Cupos. Among the more institutionalised Chilean parties it has been the parties of the centre-left that have been the focus of the most intense campaigns and proved more susceptible. However, they only implemented quotas for internal positions. The limited experience of both Chile and Argentina has convinced many activists that quota size is also crucial, and many advocate  per cent as the minimum level to achieve ' critical mass '. Yet quotas to )# Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, ' Introduction ' to Mainwaring and Scully (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions, pp. -.
increase the numbers of women involved in all aspects of electoral politics are not enough on their own to achieve gender parity. It is also necessary to influence policymaking and its implementation. In presidential systems characterised by executive dominance, legal change is difficult to achieve without government support. While the numbers of women in the executives in both countries have remained very low, state women's machineries have been the main institutional mechanism established to oversee, and in the Chilean case promote, ' women-friendly ' policies. In part due to the success of feminist lobbying at the global level, the international institutional context has become more favourable and there is now pressure on states, often complemented by donor financing, to implement policies to promote gender equity and to establish state bodies to oversee these policies.)$ The different origins and institutional context of SERNAM have made it the more influential of the two bodies in the case study countries. Unlike the Consejo, SERNAM is a permanent part of the state and the executive, its head holding a cabinet post, and it is able to put forward legislation more effectively than women legislators. SERNAM has been able to achieve some important gains, but faces resistance both inside and outside the state and therefore experiences important limitations, in part due to the institutional constraints generated by the terms of transition. In contrast to the Consejo, it was set up as a result of pressures external to the state, but it has a potentially problematic relationship with women's organisations, particularly as it has not lived up to the expectations of feminists.)% Indeed evidence from Argentina reinforces the Chilean data that the relationships between women's ministries and women's movements are not straightforward and can be conflictual.
In the study of gender and democratic consolidation in Latin America it is therefore important to look at number of themes. First, the nature of the political system must be examined, for example in terms of the sort of presidential system and electoral processes established at the time of return to competitive electoral politics as well as the institutional constraints created by the terms of transition and the ease with which those terms can be modified. Second, the structure of the political parties, their levels of institutionalisation and ideological positions must be considered. Third the nature of women's movements -their strategies, strength and goals -must also be analysed. The ways in which all these )$ Sonia Alvarez, ' Advocating Feminism : the Latin American feminist NGO '' boom '' ', International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. , no.  (), pp. -. )% Marı! a Elena Valenzuela stressed SERNAM's ambiguous position and how this complicates its relations with women's organisations outside the state (interview, Santiago,  Jan. ).
institutional structures and actors interact forms the final crucial element. In sum, the consolidation of more equitable political systems in gender terms is more likely if organised groups of women are lobbying institutionalised party systems both from within and from outside for the implementation of formal measures both to increase the numbers of women active at all political levels and to implement ' women-friendly ' policies.
